ABSTRACT Sequential allocation is a decentralized mechanism for allocating indivisible objects to agents, in which agents sequentially pick their favorite objects among the remainder based on a pre-defined priority ordering of agents (a sequence). The problem of choosing the ''best'' sequence of agents to achieve the optimal social welfare has been investigated and conjectured to be NP-hard. We propose a simple parallel allocation protocol that is insensitive to agents' identities. In every round of the parallel allocation process, every agent asks for an object among those that remain, and every reported object will be allocated randomly to an agent reporting it. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we compare the average (and worst-case) social welfare achieved by a parallel protocol and a sequential protocol. Theoretical and empirical results show that parallel protocol outperforms a sequential protocol (even when the best sequence of agents is applied). We also show that under the parallel mechanism, some manipulation problems (e.g., finding a successful strategy for a target set and finding an optimal strategy under some scoring function) can be solved in polynomial time.
I. INTRODUCTION
How to allocate resources among multiple agents in an efficient, effective, and fair way is one of the most important economic problems. Recently it has become an emerging research topic in computer science and artificial intelligence. Many centralized approaches to allocating indivisible goods have been proposed (e.g., in [1] ). In these approaches, agents are required to fully reveal their preferences to some central authority (who computes the final allocation) and pay for the resources allocated to them at some prices [2] . However, there are some drawbacks and limitations of these approaches:
• the elicitation process and the winner determination problem can be unsolvable in polynomial time;
• agents have to reveal their full preferences, which they might be reluctant to do (sometimes an elicitation process is unwelcome);
• in many real world situations (e.g., assigning courses to students [3] , [4] , and providing employment training opportunities to unemployed), resources must be allocated free and monetary side payments [5] are impossible or unwelcome. Brams et al. [6] adapted a cake-cutting protocol (a typical decentralized approach for the allocation of divisible goods [7] ) to the allocation of indivisible goods. However, the protocol is typically designed for the cases when there are only two agents. Bouveret and Lang [8] studied a sequential elicitation-free protocol. By applying this protocol, any number of objects can be allocated to any number of agents. The sequential protocol is parameterized by a pre-defined priority ordering of agents (i.e., a sequence of agents). Agents take turns to pick objects according to the sequence when the allocation process begins. Although the sequential allocation mechanism does not require agents to reveal their full preferences, it has some limitations:
• the ''best'' sequences of agents that achieve the optimal utilitarian social welfare, differ from those that achieve the optimal egalitarian social welfare;
• the problem of finding the ''best'' sequences of agents that achieve the optimal utilitarian (or egalitarian) social welfare, has been investigated and conjectured to be NP-hard [8] , [9] ;
• in many cases (e.g., allocating public resources), protocols sensitive to identities are not popular because their neutrality is questioned. In this paper, we define and study a parallel elicitationfree allocation protocol that is insensitive to agents' identities. In each round of the parallel allocation process, each agent reports her preferred object among those that remain, and every reported object will be allocated equiprobably to an agent reporting it. Applying the parallel protocol does not have costly procedures like finding ''best'' sequences. We compare the average (and worst-case) performances of parallel protocol and sequential protocol in social welfare. Theoretical and empirical results show that parallel protocol outperforms sequential protocol (even when the best sequence of agents is applied) under both the utilitarian criterion and the egalitarian criterion.
We further consider strategical issues under the parallel protocol. Assuming that there exists only one agent (a manipulator) who knows the preferences of other agents and that every other agent adopts the sincere reporting strategy, i.e., reporting her most favorite object among the remainder in every round of the allocation process, we show that the manipulator can find in polynomial time whether she has a successful strategy for getting a given set of objects regardless of uncertainty arising from lottery. We also show that if the scoring function of the manipulator is lexicographic, then an optimal strategy in the sense of pessimism can be found in polynomial time.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews some basic notions that are relevant to our work. Section 3 defines the parallel protocol. Section 4 compares the average (and worst-case) performances of parallel protocol and sequential protocol in social welfare. Section 5 considers strategical issues under the parallel protocol. Section 6 summarizes the contributions of this work and discusses future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We define an allocation problem as a triple (O, N , ), where O is a set of indivisible objects, N is the set of agents, and is a profile (i.e., a vector containing each agent's strict preference order over O). In this entire paper, it is assumed that 2 ≤ |N | ≤ |O|. The rank of object o in agent i's preference is denoted by
The objects are supposed to be free allocated to the agents. Agent i's value function v i : 2 O → R specifies her valuation on each bundle B ⊆ O with v i (∅) = 0. When B = {o}, we also write v i (B) as v i (o). For any agent i, bundle B, and object o, we assume that:
, where g is a non-increasing function from {1, . . . , |O|} to R + . g is called the scoring function. g is convex if g(x)−g(x+1) ≥ g(y) − g(y + 1) for any x ≤ y. We focus on two prototypical convex scoring functions:
is the profile shown in Table 1 . Then under Borda 
In a sequential allocation process, agents take turns to pick objects according to an order π ∈ N |O| . We use π (k) to denote the k th agent designated by π . If all the agents act truthfully, then in each round k, agent π (k) selects her mostpreferred remaining object. Let o(π, k) denote the object that is honestly selected by agent π (k) at stage k of the sequential process. So given a scoring function g, agent i's utility w.r.t. (π, ) can be measured as:
The social welfare achieved by the sequential allocation process needs to be measured by an aggregation function. We consider two typical aggregation functions: (utilitarian criterion) sw u (π, ) = i∈N u i (π, ); and (egalitarian criterion)sw e (π, ) = min i∈N u i (π, ).
Furthermore, in many situations, the mechanism designer is unable to compute agents' actual individual utility because the agents are reluctant to reveal their full preferences. So she can only calculate an expected utility, given a probability distribution over profiles. Let denote the set of all possible profiles (it is easy to find that | | = (|O|!) |N | ). In this entire paper, we closely follow the full independence assumption made in [8] . That is to say, the probability of any profile ∈ is 1/| |. Then agent i's expected utility w.r.t. π (a sequence of agents) is defined as:
Consequently, the expected social welfare (under the utilitarian criterion and the egalitarian criterion) w.r.t. π are defined as:
and 
The sequential allocation process is described in Table 2 .
Then under Borda scoring function, u 1 (π, ) 5 + 4 = 9, and u 3 (π, ) = g B (r 3 (o 3 )) + g B (r 3 (o 5 )) = 4 + 3 = 7. Consequently, sw u (π, ) = 5 + 9 + 7 = 21, and sw e (π, ) = min{5, 9, 7} = 5.
If is unknown, agents' individual utility and social welfare induced by π can only be estimated by expected values. In fact, under Borda scoring function, u 1 (π ) = 5, u 2 (π ) = 7.2, and u 3 (π ) = 7.5. So sw u (π ) = 19.7, and sw e (π) = 5.
III. A PARALLEL PROTOCOL INSENSITIVE TO IDENTITIES
The sequential allocating method is a very simple decentralized protocol, but it requires agents to pick objects according to their identities. In many cases (e.g., allocating public resources), protocols sensitive to identities are not popular because their neutrality is questioned. In this section, we introduce a parallel allocating method that is insensitive to agents' identities.
The parallel allocation we consider is described as follows. In each round, every agent asks for an object among the remaining ones. If an object is asked for by only one agent then it is allocated to the agent, otherwise the agents demanding it draw lots for the right to get the object. The lot is supposed to be fair, i.e., if there are k agents drawing lots then each agent has 1/k chance of winning the lot. Then go to the next round and repeat this process as long as objects remain.
We use a i (k) and n o (k) to denote the object reported by agent i and the numbers of agents demanding object o in round k, respectively. Then the set of objects demanded in round k is O k = {a i (k)|i ∈ N }, and the allocation process terminates in round Since the allocation result driven by the parallel protocol is nondeterministic in general, given a scoring function g, agent i's utility w.r.t. is defined as:
The social welfare achieved by the parallel allocation process can measured as: (utilitarian criterion) sw * u ( ) = i∈N u * i ( ); and (egalitarian criterion) sw * e ( ) = min i∈N u * i ( ). In the cases where is unknown, the definitions of agents' expected individual utility and expected social welfare can be naturally extended to the parallel allocation process. Agent i's expected utility is:
The expected social welfare (under the utilitarian criterion and the egalitarian criterion) are defined as:
and
Note that agents' identities do not affect the parallel allocation process. The parallel protocol has the advantage of neutrality (no agent is considered particularly) over the sequential protocol. We can get the following lemma directly. 
794. In the following discussion, if N = {1, 2} then denotes ( 2 , 1 ) for any profile = ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ (it is easy to find that = ), agent 1 denotes agent 2, agent 2 denotes agent 1, π denotes π (1)•π (2)•. . .•π (|π |) for any sequence of agents π ∈ |O| k=1 N k , and denotes {{ } ∪ { }| ∈ } ( is a partition of ).
IV. COMPARING PARALLEL PROTOCOL WITH SEQUENTIAL PROTOCOL IN SOCIAL WELFARE
Besides neutrality, the mechanism designer is concerned with the performance of an allocation protocol in social welfare. In this section, we compare the average (and worst-case) performances of parallel protocol and sequential protocol in social welfare. Theoretical and empirical results show that parallel protocol has advantage over sequential protocol.
A. AVERAGE PERFORMANCE (I.E., PERFORMANCE IN EXPECTED SOCIAL WELFARE)
A sequence of agents π ∈ N |O| is said to be optimal under scoring function g and utilitarian (or egalitarian) criterion if 
In [8] , under Borda scoring function, some optimal sequences for small numbers of objects and agents were found with exhaustive search, and the problem of finding an optimal sequence is conjectured to be NP-hard. It is proved in [9] that if N = {1, 2} then the alternating order (i.e., 1
is optimal under Borda scoring function and utilitarian criterion.
\ {π, π }. On another hand, applying the parallel protocol does not have costly procedures like finding optimal sequences. This is another advantage of the parallel protocol over the sequential protocol.
We first compare the expected social welfare achieved by parallel protocol and that achieved by sequential protocol under utilitarian criterion. For small numbers of objects and agents (i.e., |O| and |N |), under Borda and lexicographic scoring function (i.e., g B and g L ), we get the optimal sequences (denoted by π * ) and the values of sw u (π * ) and sw * u with exhaustive search and computation. It is not surprising that the computation time grows dramatically in |O| and |N |. The results that can be obtained in less than a few minutes are shown in Table 4 . Note that in Table 4 and the following  Table 5 , n denotes the sequence 1•2•. . .•n for all 2 ≤ n ∈ N, and all the connective symbols • are omitted for the sake of space.
We observe that when |N | = 2 and 10 ≥ |O| ≥ 4, the values of sw u (π * ) and sw * u are equal; however, when |N | > 2, the values of sw * u are strictly greater than those of sw u (π * ). These results suggest that, for small numbers of agents and objects, we could have a better utilitarian social welfare if we apply parallel protocol rather than sequential protocol. The following theorems show that it is not a coincidence.
Theorem 1: Let N = {1, 2} and π be the alternating Proof: Since is a partition of , according to equation (6) and (7), we have
It is easy to find that
∈ , and π ∈ N |O| . Then from equation (2) and (3),
Pick a profile from arbitrarily. Suppose the allocation process induced by the parallel protocol terminates in round K . We use K +1 sequences of agents and 4K +4 vectors (i.e., π k ⊆ π , and vs k i , vp k i ∈ R |O| , for any i ∈ {1, 2} and 0 ≤ k ≤ K ) to simulate the parallel allocation process, and the sequential allocation processes induced by π and π. Intuitively,
• if agent i has c chance of obtaining object o in some round k ≤ k of the parallel allocation process, then
is the set of objects demanded in round k of the parallel allocation process);
• if agent i has c chance of obtaining object o at some stage s ≤ |π | − |π k | of the allocation process induced π , and if i has c chance of obtaining o at some stage s ≤ |π | − |π k | of the allocation process induced π , then
and vp k i
are defined as follows:
• if agent 1 and 2 report the same object o ∈ O in round k of the parallel allocation process, then
• if agent 1 reports object o and agent 2 reports object o s.t. o = o in round k of the parallel allocation process, then
• if π k−1 = j • π k for some j ∈ N (that is to say, agent j picks some object o at stage |π | − |π k | of the sequential allocation process induced by π, and agent j picks some object o at stage |π | − |π k | of the allocation process induced by π ) then for any 1 ≤ t ≤ |O|,
otherwise.
, otherwise.
• 
According to the definitions of π k , vp k i , and vs k i , we can find that for any i ∈ N :
Now we are going to show that
for any i ∈ N and 1 ≤ t ≤ |O| with the inductive method.
for any i ∈ {1, 2}, 1 ≤ t ≤ |O| and some k ≥ 0. 3) In round k + 1 of the parallel process, there are only two cases that can occur: Case I Agent 1 and 2 report the same object o. Then
for any i ∈ {1, 2} and t = r i (o),
in some round k < k + 1 of the parallel allocation process. Then [t] for any i ∈ {1, 2} and 1 ≤ t ≤ |O|.
for any i ∈ N and 1 ≤ t ≤ |O|. Then according to equation (11) and (12), we have u i (π, ) + u i (π , ) = 2u * i ( ) for all i ∈ N . Because is picked from arbitrarily, we have sw u (π ) = sw * u from equation (9) and (10) .
From Theorem 1 and Remak 1, the following theorem is established immediately. From Table 4 , we conjecture that under any convex scoring function, for any |N | > 2 and π ∈ N |O| , sw * u > sw u (π ). We also compare the expected social welfare achieved by parallel protocol and that achieved by sequential protocol under egalitarian criterion. For small numbers of objects and agents (i.e., |O| and |N |), under Borda and lexicographic scoring function (i.e., g B and g L ), we get the optimal sequences (denoted by π * ) and the values of sw e (π * ) and sw * e with exhaustive search and computation. The results that can be obtained in less than a few minutes are shown in Table 5 . Parallel protocol outperforms sequential protocol in all the test cases. The following theorem shows that it is not a coincidence. Case I π ∈ {π * , π * }. Then under Borda scoring function,
Case IIπ = π * . Pick a profile from arbitrarily. Then apply the parallel protocol over . Suppose the parallel allocation process terminates in round K . Let O k denote the set of objects demanded in round
and o 2 (k) denote the object reported by agent 1 and 2 respectively if |O k | = 2. We divide π (and o 1 (t) )) + g B (r 2 (o 2 (t))). Consequently,
It can be found that
So from equation (13) and (14), we have
− u 2 (π, ) − u 2 (π, ) (15) Delete the phases whose length is 2 from π, we achieve a sequence of agentsπ = π s 1 
• K ≥ 0 (if K = 0 thenπ is an empty sequence),
In fact, it is easy to find that:
for all i ∈ N = {1, 2}, because both agent 1 and agent 2 demand o(s a ) in round s a of the parallel allocation process when o(s b ) is still available. Consequently, we have
Since is picked arbitrarily from , from equation (15) and (16) (18) Then according equation (2), (17), and (18), we have u 2 (π ) < u 1 (π ). So sw e (π ) = u 2 (π ) <
e (Lemma 1). Case III π = π * . It can be proved that sw e (π ) < sw * e by using a method analogous to the one adopted in Case II.
To sum up, sw e (π) < sw * e for every π ∈ N |O| . Table 4 and Table 5 suggest that, for small numbers of agents and objects, parallel protocol is a better choice than sequential protocol for the balance of utilitarianism and egalitarianism in expected social welfare. From Table 5 , we further conjecture that under any convex scoring function g, for all |N | ≥ 2 and π ∈ N |O| , sw * e > sw e (π ).
B. WORST-CASE PERFORMANCE
Sometimes the mechanism designer is also concerned with worst-case (not average) performance of an allocation protocol in social welfare. Let π be a sequence of agents and π ∈ N |O| , be a profile, i.e., ∈ . With an induction on the number of objects that have been picked (or demanded) in the sequential (or parallel) process, we can immediately get the upper bound of the rank of an object to the agent who picks (or demands) it.
(Note that π (k), o(π, k), a i (k), and n o (k) have been defined in section 2.)
Obviously, if all the agents have the same ranking over objects then the utilitarian social welfare achieved by parallel protocol and sequential protocol with any π ∈ N |O| are same. Several notions about worst-case social welfare are defined as follows:
; sw e (π ) = min ∈ (sw e (π, )), sw e = min π∈N |O| (sw e (π )); (19) For all 1 ≤ k ≤ |O|, we use η π (k) to denote the number of objects that have been picked since the last time agent π (k) picked an object, formally,
For all i ∈ N , we use ς π (i) to denote the number of objects that will be picked after agent i's final picking, formally,
For example, if |O| = 6, N = {1, 2, 3}, and
and so on.
The following Remark can be found in [10] . It will be used to prove Theorem 4.
Remark 4: Let g be a vector such that g
The following theorem states that the worst-case utilitarian social welfare achieved by parallel protocol and sequential protocol are same, and sequential protocol has more chances to achieve the worst-case utilitarian social welfare.
Theorem 4: Let g be the scoring function. Then for all
. The probability of achieving the worst-case utilitarian social welfare by applying sequential protocol with π , is i∈N (ς π (i)!) 1≤k≤|O| (η π (k)!) times the probability of achieving the worst-case utilitarian social welfare by applying parallel protocol.
Proof: Pick arbitrarily a sequence of agents π from N |O| , a profile from , and a permutation γ of the objects in O.
. From Remark 3, this lower bound is tight. So from equation (19) ,
2) Suppose the parallel allocation process terminates in round K (obviously, 1 ≤ K ≤ |O|). Let w and 1 ∈ N |O| such that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ |O|, 1(k) = 1 and
From equation (5) and Remark 2, we have
On the other hand, with an induction on the value of k, it is easy to find that
Then according to equation (20) and Remark 4, we have sw
. Then according item 2) and Remark 4, w(k) = 1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ |O|. That is to say, in every round of the parallel allocation process, there exists only one object reported, i.e., all the agents have the same ranking over objects. Suppose o k is the object reported in round k of the parallel allocation process for all 1 ≤ k ≤ |O|. Then we have only one possible profile such that sw
Because each agent i is silent at all the stage t such that π (t) = i, can be and must be constructed according to the following steps:
is the number of objects that have been picked since the last time agent π(k) picked an object). Then for all 1 ≤ k ≤ |O| and 1
is the number of objects that will be picked after agent i's final picking). Then for each i ∈ N and 1 To sum up, from items 1) and 2), sw u (π ) = sw u = sw * u = |O| k=1 g(k); from item 3), item 4), and the fact that all profiles are equally probable (see this in section 2), the probability of achieving the worst-case utilitarian social welfare by applying sequential protocol with π, is i∈N (ς π (i)!) 1≤k≤|O| (η π (k)!) times the probability of achieving the worst-case utilitarian social welfare by applying parallel protocol.
The proof above provides a method for generating profiles from which the worst-case utilitarian social welfare emerges. The method is illustrated in the following example.
such that sw u (π, ) = sw u . The production of one of these profiles is shown in Fig. 1 , where Now let's turn our attention to worst-case egalitarian social welfare. The following theorem states that if there is no limitation on the picking sequence π ∈ N |O| then the worst-case egalitarian social welfare achieved by sequential protocol is trivial, otherwise under some scoring function, by applying some picking sequence, sequential protocol may outperform parallel protocol under the worst-case egalitarian social welfare criterion. Proof: If there exists some agent that has no chance to pick any object during the whole sequential allocation process (for example, consider π = 1 • 1 • . . . when 2 ∈ N ) then the egalitarian social welfare is zero. So under any scoring function, sw e = 0.
Pick a profile from arbitrarily. Apply parallel protocol on and suppose the parallel allocation process terminates in round K (it is easy to find that K ≥ |O| |N | ). Then according to Remark 2 and the fact that there are at most |N | objects reported in each round, we have for all i ∈ N :
Note that this lower bound is not tight because n a i (k) (k) = 1 when there are |N | objects are reported in round k. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and
• From Remark 2, it is easy to find that under Borda scoring function g B , sw e (π ) = 5. Consider the profile shown in Table 1 . We can find that under g B , sw * e ≤ sw * e ( ) = 4.833 < 5 = sw e (π ).
• From Remark 2, it is easy to find that under lexicographic scoring function
On the other hand, we can find that under g L , for all i ∈ N and ∈ , u
we only consider the first two rounds of the parallel process). Consequently, under g L , we have sw * e > 8 > 6 = sw e (π ).
To sum up, there exists some picking sequences π ∈ N |O| s.t. sw e (π ) > sw * e under some scoring function, and vice verse under some other scoring function.
V. STRATEGICAL ISSUES
As most collective decision mechanisms, the parallel protocol is not strategyproof. See Example 3. Because of the uncertainty arising from lottery, agent 1 can not ensure obtaining even a single object. So from a conservative point of view, she may act strategically to avoid this situation. For example, if agent 1 knows other agents' preferences and reports o 2 in the first round, then she can get g (2) units of utility at least, which is better than zero.
In this paper, we accept the assumption made in [8] , i.e., all agents but the only one manipulator act truthfully. In the following discussion, without loss of generality, let agent 1 be the manipulator that knows the rankings of the other agents (i.e., agent 1 knows ( 2 , . . . , |N | )), and
A strategy for the manipulator is a sequence of objects τ = o 1 , . . . , o T such that o t ∈ O and o t = o t for all 1 ≤ t = t ≤ T . That is to say, τ specifies which object the manipulator should report in any round 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Some strategies may fail because some object that the manipulator intends to report has already been allocated. We say strategy τ is well-defined with respect to ( 2 , . . . , |N | ) if in any round 1 ≤ t ≤ T , object o t is still available, and there is no object available after round T .
A manipulation problem M for the manipulator consists of ( 2 , . . . , |N | ), and a target set of objects S ⊆ O. A welldefined strategy τ is successful for M if assuming other agents act sincerely, τ ensures that the manipulator gets all objects in S. Solving M consists in determining whether there exists a successful strategy. Below we show that the manipulation problem M can be solved in polynomial time. 
Second, for a target set S ⊆ O, we use OA k , OD k ⊆ O and S k ⊆ S to describe the requirements that every successful strategy should meet in round k of the parallel allocation process. Intuitively,
• OA k denotes the set of objects that can remain after round k − 1,
• S k denotes the set of target objects that must be achieved no later than round k,
• and OD k denotes the set of objects supposed to be demanded by other agents in round k. Formally, let N = N \ {1}, then OA k ,OD k and S k can be defined as follows: 
Proof: Now we prove the claims of the lemma with an induction on the number t of rounds in the parallel allocation process. 1) Since S ⊆ S ⊆ O, according to Lemma 2, we have
• According to Lemma 2,
e., there must be some q < p such that o ∈ S q . So according to the assumption, we have 
round p. Let τ be a well-defined strategy reporting the object specified by τ in any round k < p, and reporting o p in round p. We can find that τ is successful for M . (Necessity) If there exists some p ≥ k ≥ 1 such that k ≤ | 1≤t≤k S t |, then there must be some i ∈ {2, . . . , |N |} reporting some o ∈ 1≤t≤k S t in some round k ≤ k. In this case, there is no successful strategy for M . So the statement holds for any S ⊆ O s.t. |S| = p. From items 1), 2), and 3), the statement holds for any S ⊆ O.
We develop Algorithm 1 (in which the set of objects O and the set of agents N are supposed to be global variables) to find successful strategies. The soundness and completeness of the algorithm is from the proof of Theorem 5. It is easy to find that Algorithm 1 always terminates and is polynomial in |O| and |N |. In fact, Algorithm 1 is an O(|N ||O| 3 ) algorithm.
We say a well-defined strategy τ is optimal (in the sense of pessimism) if it maximizes the manipulator's benefit that can be achieved regardless of uncertainty arising from lottery. In fact, it is easy to find that if the manipulator's scoring function is the lexicographic scoring function g L then for all o ∈ O, we have
Consequently, the manipulator can find an optimal strategy (in the sense of pessimism) in polynomial time by applying Algorithm 2. The basic idea of the algorithm is to build the best set of objects that the manipulator can manage to get in a greedy way, considering the objects one after the other in decreasing order of 1 . If the manipulator can get an object o together with the already secured objects, then o is added to the best set of objects that she can get; otherwise it is not. And then move on to the next object. Algorithm 2 calls Algorithm 1 to check whether there exists a successful strategy. 
VI. CONCLUSION
We defined and studied a parallel protocol for allocating indivisible goods without elicitation process. The protocol is insensitive to identities, and its application is simple. We compare parallel protocol with sequential protocol with respect to the expected (and worst-case) social welfare. Theoretical and empirical results show that parallel protocol outperforms sequential protocol (even when the best sequence of agents is applied) under both the utilitarian criterion and the egalitarian criterion. Regarding strategical issues, we proved that an agent who knows the preferences of other agents can find in polynomial time whether she has a successful strategy for a target set; and that if the scoring function of the manipulator is lexicographic, she could compute an optimal strategy (in the sense of pessimism) in polynomial time.
One possible question about our parallel allocation mechanism is what is the impact of strategic behavior on the complete-information extensive-form game [11] of such parallel allocation procedures. In the future, we plan to view the parallel allocation process as a finite repeated game with perfect information, where all agents act strategically; investigate the loss of social welfare by manipulation, and the price of anarchy [12] , [13] .
Another possible question is how does the parallel protocol perform in situations, in which there is some intermediate correlation between agents' rankings. In the future, we plan to assess the proposed mechanism empirically through simulations based both on randomly generated classes of preferences, as well as real-world data. And then we are going to study the incentive compatibility [14] of the mechanism.
There are still several related future research issues:
• to prove the conjectures (proposed in this paper) about the social welfare achieved by parallel protocol;
• to investigate other strategical issues under the proposed mechanism (e.g., the manipulator's scoring function is not lexicographic [15] , she is risk-neutral or riskseeking, and so on);
• to extend or modify our preference model (e.g., to consider additive preferences with possible indifferences between single objects [16] , non-additive preferences, ordinal preferences [17] , and externalities [18] );
• and to modify the proposed protocol for problems of one-sided matching (e.g., team formation market [19] , and roommate problem [20] 
